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Luttrell: Civil Commitment in Texas - An Illusion of Due Process.

COMMENTS
CIVIL COMMITMENT IN TEXAS-AN ILLUSION
OF DUE PROCESS
WILLIS LUTTRELL
Over 400,000 individuals in the United States were committed to state and
county mental hospitals in 1972, and forty-two percent were committed involuntarily under civil procedures.' Upon commitment these individuals lost
their personal freedom, significant civil rights, and suffered a social stigma,
which, in many cases, deprived them of the ability to earn a living. 2 The state
power of civil commitment is extensive in its application and effect.3 This
power has its source in the state police power, the right to protect the public,
and the parens patriae doctrine. 4 Neither power is absolute, however, but
must instead be balanced against the personal rights of the individual.a Failure of the states to give adequate consideration to this balance has, in the last
four years, resulted in nine states having their civil commitment procedures
declared unconstitutional. 6 This reflects the judiciary's increased concern for
1. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATISTICAL NOTE 105 at 2, 8

(1974).
2. In re Fisher, 313 N.E.2d 851, 857 (Ohio 1974). The right to drive an automobile or practice a licensed profession is lost on commitment. If the person is also
found to be incompetent, he loses his right to manage his property, to vote, to contract,
and to marry. See In re Brown, 68 F.R.D. 172, 173 (D.D.C. 1975) (employment);
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44
TEXAs L. REV. 424, 467-69 (1966); Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1193-1201 (1974).
3. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411
F. Supp. 1113, 1121-24 (D. Hawaii 1976) (current status); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d
109, 117-24 (W. Va. 1974) (historical development). See generally Comment, Civil
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207-45 (1974).
Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
4. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Coll .v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 912-13 (D.N.J. 1976); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedure, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288, 1289-97
(1966). The parens patriae doctrine concerns the right of the state to protect those
who cannot protect themselves. Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 912 (D.N.J. 1976).
5. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-75 (1975); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 20 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960); Heryford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
6. See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 453 (S.D. Iowa 1976); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 141, 142 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp.
1113, 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Neb.
1975); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1053-54 (E.D. Pa.), stay granted, 96
S. CL 558 (1975); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 419 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch
v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 397 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand,
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individual rights by strengthening the constitutional standards of due process
7
in civil commitments.
The decisions to implement these more stringent procedural standards have
not been free from controversy." The increased formality of the process
tends to force those who are actually mentally ill out of the hospital and into
the courtrooms, thereby inhibiting the patient's recovery. Persons subjected
to commitment hearings, however, are presumed to be sane and competent. 10
Because their personal freedom is the principal issue, the state has "the
inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process.""
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The judicial argument and policy considerations for strengthening the due
process safeguards in civil commitment proceedings parallel the considerations involved in juvenile delinquency proceedings.' 2 Both generally are not
adversary in nature and involve a person who may not be competent to
determine what courses of action are in his best interest. 1 3 In fact, a considerable number of recent decisions on the constitutionality of civil commitment
statutes have relied upon an analogy between these two types of proceedings.' 4 The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of In re Gault," found
that the states' well intended elimination of procedural safeguards in juvenile
379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand,
413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974). See
also Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D.N.J. 1976) (deficient statute recently
revised); In re Fisher, 313 N.E.2d 851, 858 (Ohio 1974) (judicial construction of statute); Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 573-74 (Wash. 1974) (judicial construction of
statute).
7. Compare the procedural safeguards in Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113,
1127 (D. Hawaii 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Neb. 1975),
with the summary process reported in Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TExAS L. REV. 424, 442-43 (1966), and the medical
approach endorsed in Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, 50 MICH. L. REv. 837,
859-63 (1952).
8. See Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 580-85 (Wash. 1974) (concurring opinion).
9. See Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1050 (E.D. Pa.), stay granted, 96
S. Ct. 558 (1975); Comment, 7 LOYOLA Cm. L.J. 507, 520-23 (1976).
10. See White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 587, 196 S.W. 508, 515 (1917).
11. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); accord, Stamus v.
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 445 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Comment, The "Crime" of Mental
Illness: Extention of "Criminal" Procedural Safeguards to Involuntary Civil Commitments, 66 J. CriM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 270 (1975).
12. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
111,
44 TEXAS L. REV. 424, 448-49 (1966).
13. Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1967), with Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1084-88 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473.
(1974).
14. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1968); Stamus v.
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 446-47 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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delinquency hearings had not actually operated in the best interests of the
juvenile.18 Therefore, the constitutional due process safeguards applied to
these hearings were substantially strengthened. The Court reasoned that the
best interest of individuals could be more accurately determined and the policy of the state more uniformly applied by adherence to the orderliness and
impartiality of standardized procedure. 17 The Court refused, however, to
directly apply adult criminal due process standards but, instead, applied
standards of procedure that would preserve many of the advantages inherent
in a separate juvenile system.18 An inference can be drawn from this case
that an individual may be deprived of his liberty with fewer due process safeguards when a state proceeding is in his best interest.19 One court applied
this reasoning to civil commitment proceedings, holding that due process safe20
guards could be relaxed when a mental patient receives adequate treatment.
This quid pro quo theory was severely criticized and has not yet received
approval from the Supreme Court. 21 Due process relates more to the overall
fairness achieved through uniformity of procedure than achievement of the
22
most desirable result in a specific instance.
A procedure which relegates commitment decisions to family, friends, and
mental health professionals, with such a potential for arbitrariness and abuse,
Additionally, these parties
fails to provide this uniformity of procedure. 2
24
may not impartially and accurately consider the individual's best interest.
Family and friends may be strongly biased in favor of commitment to relieve
themselves of a legal or moral obligation, to conserve an inheritable estate,
or simply because the individual's deviation from the local social norms
creates a continued embarrassment. 25 One commentator has criticized the
16. Id. at 18-20.
17. Id. at 26-27.
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id. at 21. This was evidently the original concept in moving the juvenile from
the harsh realities of criminal law courts and placing them under the parental protection

of the juvenile court judge. See id. at 15-17.
20. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S.
563 (1975).
21. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). But see Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974) (constitutional
right to adequate treatment).
22. This does not mean that the person's best interest should not be considered
in establishing and delineating these safeguards. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1967).
23. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp.
509, 516 (D. Neb. 1975)."
24. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 749-50 (1974); Rosenhan, On Being

Sane in insane Places, 13

SANTA CLARA LAW.

379, 394-98 (1973).

25. See Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex. Civ. App. -Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, no writ) (dissenting opinion) (legal or moral obligation); State ex rel. Hawks

v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974) (conserve inheritable estate); Friedman

& Daly, Civil Commitment and the Doctrine of Balance: A Critical Analysis, 13
SANTA CLARA LAW. 503, 514-15 (1973) (nuisance).
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tendency of society to institutionalize individuals solely because their personality is unattractive and they make people around them uncomfortable. 26
There is also evidence that psychiatrists are not entirely free of bias.2 7 One
reason for this bias is that medical doctors, because of their training and
experience, strongly advocate that it is better to treat a possibly nonexistent
disease, where the treatment is not harmful, than let an existing disease go
untreated. 28 In the field of psychiatry this thesis is supported by the widely
publicized cases in which the doctor is sued for malpractice because he did
not confine a patient who later proved to be dangerous. 29 Whether or not
a person is dangerous, with minor exceptions, is much more dependent upon
,his environment and specific conflicts than on his diagnosed mental state. s0
Recognizing their limitations in predicting dangerous conduct, psychiatrists
naturally tend to be overcautious. 3' Added to this is the fact that medicine
is an inexact science.3 2 Studies have shown that psychiatrists have considerable difficulty distinguishing the "sane" from the "insane. '3 3 When all these
factors are considered, it is at least arguable that a psychiatrist's judgment
as to whether or not a certain individual is a proper subject for commitment
is as accurate as the impartial findings of a court. 34 Therefore, the final
determination on commitment should rest with the court and not be delegated
to the attending physicians.3 5. Even if these public policy arguments are discounted, a number of courts have found them convincing, and as a result,
there has been an almost revolutionary change in the standards of due process
applied to civil commitment. 3 6
STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The Texas Mental Health Code37 has been described as one of the most
26. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalizationand the Adversary Process,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 897 (1975).,
27. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. Rav. 693, 726-29 (1974).
28. See Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CARA LAw. 379,
385 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1966); Johnson
v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283, 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Merchants Nat'l Bank
&Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409, 414-15 (D.N.D. 1967).
30. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 732-34 (1974).
31. Id. at 735-36.
32. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
33. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CARA LAw. 379, 398
1973).
34. See Temerlin, Diagnostic Bias in Community Mental Health, 6 .CoMMUNrTY
MENTAL HEALTH J. 110, 115 (1970).
35. See Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516 (D. Neb. 1975) (impartial commission).
36. See cases cited note 6 supra.
37. TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547 (Supp. 1976).
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carefully drafted statutes of its kind in the country.38

Significantly, the wel-

fare of those who were truly mentally ill was a major consideration of the
draftsmen. 89 Prior to the current enactments, due process safeguards when
in conflict with the interests of the "patient" were compromised to the point
that they were criticized as being constitutionally deficient. 40 The 64th
Texas Legislature made significant progress, however, toward correcting these
deficiencies. 41 The 1975 amendment to the Mental Health Code requires
a warrant prior to emergency detention and the consideration of less restrictive alternatives to total confinement. 42 Perhaps an even more significant
change is the provision for direct appeal to the courts of civil appeals. 48
Since opinions of these courts are reported, civil commitment proceedings will
probably acquire more visibility, and more discerning judicial construction of
the statute will result 44
There -remains, however, some question as to
whether the current civil commitment procedure violates the constitutional
due process requirements. 45 In order to understand these deficiencies, a
comparison of due process standards with the Texas statute and associated
46
judicial opinions is necessary.
EMERGENCY DETENTION
The state has the right to temporarily detain a mentally ill person when
38.
(1966).
39.
L. REv.
40.
41.

Weihofen, Mental Health Services for the Poor, 54

CALIF.

L. REv. 920, 938

Comment, Texas Involuntary Commitment Laws-Unconstitutional?,25 BAYLOR
273, 278-79 (1973).
See id. at 273-74.
See Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 377, §§ 1-7, at 981-82 (effective June 19, 1975); Id.

ch. 616, § 1, at 1913 (effective Sept. 1, 1975).
42. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-27 (Supp. 1976) (warrant required); id.

art. 5547-38(c) (less restrictive alternatives).
43. See id. arts. 5547-39d, 5547-57 (Supp. 1976).
44. The previous statute provided for appeal to the district court. Tex. Laws 1957,
ch. 243, § 57, at 516; see Vail v. Vail, 438 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1969, no writ).
45. Contrast the strict procedure required by Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp.
439, 453 (S.D. Iowa 1976), with Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). In Greene the trial court failed to make written
findings of fact or conclusions of law. "[S]uch facts as are necessary to support the
trial court's judgment must be presumed to have been found." Id. at 102. The court
did not inquire as to whether the proposed patient had voluntarily and intelligently
waived her right to be present, whether the trial court followed the correct standard
of proof, whether the appointed counsel was effective, or whether the conclusions on
the certificates of the two physicians were sufficient evidence to sustain the burden of
proof. Id. at 103-04 (dissenting opinion). It should be noted that the proposed patient,
through another attorney, filed a motion to set aside the judgment on the same day
that was specified in the notice as the date for the hearing. Id. at 101-02.
46. This analysis has been limited to those areas where the statute has a reasonable
probability of being unconstitutionally applied or unconstitutional on its face. Additionally, it does not extend to the criminally insane. The recent inclusion of "persons
charged with a criminal offense" was apparently made to support a specific policy rather
than to correct a constitutional deficiency. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts.
5547-31, 5547-36 (Supp. 1976), with Berney v. State, 462 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. 1971).
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thereis an imminent threat that the person will harm himself or. others. 47
Emergency detention of a person may only be maintained for a reasonable
time. 48 What constitutes a reasonable period of detention in such cases has
not yet been fully defined. 49 Some jurisdictions hold that the restraint is justified for the time required to arrange for a full hearing on -the need for
commitment. 50 Other jurisdictions consider such an extended period of time
unreasonable and require a separate probable cause hearing prior to the full
hearing. 5 '
The Texas civil commitment procedure. appears to comply fully with the
constitutional requirements for emergency detention. 52 A person may be
taken into custody on the representation of a credible person that the individual is mentally ill and thereby "likely to cause injury to himself or others
if not immediately restrained."5 3 A health or peace officer must then obtain
54
a warrant from a magistrate prior to taking that person into custody.
Within the first twenty-four hours of custody a physician must examine the
person and prepare a certificate of medical examination. 5 Except for weekends and, holidays or upon written order of a county or probate court, the
custody cannot be extended beyond.twenty-four hours.5 6 When the person
is placed in custody or there has been an application for temporary hospitalization, the appropriate court must set a date for a hearing within fourteen
57
days.
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

The proposed patient has a constitutional right to timely and effective
notice-notice that contains the time and place of the hearing and sufficient
47. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975); Bell v. Wayne County Gen.
Hosp., 3.84 F. Supp. 1085, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
48. See_.Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
49. See Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 910-11 (D.N.J. 1976) (20 days); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975) (5 days).
50. See Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 910-11 (D.N.J. 1976).
51. Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
52. This does not mean that the process is free from abuse. See Jones, Emergency
Restraint Under the Texas Mental Health Code, 33 TEx. B.J. 31 (1970). Failure to
strictly follow the provisions of the Code will render the commitment illegal. See Florence v.. Crawford, 351 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ); cf.
Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1973) (confinement for more than
24 hours without a court order constitutes false imprisonment).
53. TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-27 (Supp. 1976).
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 5547-30.
56. Id. art. 5547-27.
57. Compare id. art. 5547-40, with id. art. 5547-67(d).
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information to allow the person to prepare his defense.58 One court has
interpreted this to mean that:
[T]he notice should include a clear statement of the purpose of the
proceedings and of the possible consequences to the subject thereof,
a statement of the legal standard upon which commitment is authorized,
the names of examining physicians and others who may testify in favor
of detention and the substance of their proposed testimony.5 9
The notice requirements may be less stringent, however, when the state
invariably provides effective counsel.6 0
Additionally, the individual has a right to be present at the commitment
hearing and participate to the extent of his ability to do so. 6' The court has
an obligation to ensure that this right is not derogated.6 2 Inquiry should be
made into the nature of medication being administered to the individual to
ensure that excessive or inappropriate medication has not impaired his ability
to function effectively at the hearing.63 If the right to be present is waived
by the individual, the waiver must be approved by the court upon a judicial
finding that the person understood his rights and was competent to waive
them. 64 Similarly, his physical presence may be excused if he is so
mentally or physically ill as to be incapable of attending.6 5
For temporary commitment the Texas Mental Health Code requires that
the individual "be personally served with a copy of the application [for
commitment] and written notice of the time and place of hearing thereon
... "66

When indefinite commitment is involved, additional details are

required in the notice. 7 For either type of commitment the court appointed
attorney ad litem must have access to all records and papers relating to the
58. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 446-47 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127 (D. Hawaii 1976); Hawks v. Lazaro,
202 S.E.2d 109, 124 (W. Va. 1974).
59. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127 (D. Hawaii 1976); accord,

Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D.Neb. 1975); Lynch v.Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
60. See Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D.N.J. 1976).

61.

See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 447 (S.D. Iowa 1976).

62. See Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 124-25 (W. Va. 1974).
63. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974); accord, State v.
O'Neill, 545 P.2d 97, 104 (Ore. 1976). Administration of incapacitating drugs to pa-

tients in mental hospitals may be a common practice.

See Roth, Dayley, & Lerner,

Into the Abyss: PsychiatricReliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 400, 418-19 (1973).
64. See Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1051 (E.D. Pa.), stay granted, 96
S. Ct. 558 (1975) (commitment of a child); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 38889 (M.D. Ala. 1974). But see Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 125 (W. Va. 1974)
(presence cannot be waived).
65. This determination may be made by the court only after an adversary hearing
as to its truth. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1129 (D. Hawaii 1976);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
66. TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-33 (1958).
67. See id. art. 5547-44 (Supp. 1976).
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case.0 8 Therefore, if the attorney provides effective representation, a strong
argument can be made that the Code meets the current minimum due process
requirements. 69

The extent of the individual's right to be present at the hearing is not well
delineated. The Code provides that the individual is not required to be
present but will not be denied this right. 70 This conforms to personal appearance requirements of civil suits in general, yet it fails to meet the more stringent requirements established for civil commitment actions. 71 Although not
as critical as the presence of the accused in criminal trials, the individual may
be excused only within specific exceptions and under the close supervision
of the court. 72 Even where the court finds that the individual must be present to satisfy constitutional due process standards, there appears to be no statutory authority to require his presence. 73 Assuming that this authority exists,
the statute conferring it must be considered to be vague and may be unconstitutional for its failure to "provide substantial procedures" in this critical
74
area.
IMPARTIAL HEARING

The essence of due process is a fair and impartial hearing. 75 During the
course of a civil commitment hearing the State has the burden of proving
that the subject of the hearing is mentally ill and presents a danger to himself or to others.7 6 This proof must be something more than the preponderance of evidence common to other civil suits. 77

The courts are divided,

68. See id. art. 5547-33 (1958).
69. If the appointed counsel keeps his client informed as to the pertinent contents
of the reports and their legal significance, then there is less need for detail in the notice.
See Coll v. Hyland, 41.1 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D.N.J. 1976). The counter argument is
that this level of effectiveness of counsel is not universally achieved in practice. See
Brunetti, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof, and Effective Assistance of Counsel
in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 29 Sw. L.J. 684, 707 (1975).

70. TEX.REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36(b) (Supp. 1976).
71. See Note, Constitutional Problems of Civil Commitment Procedures in New
Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REV. 113, 133-34 (1975).
72. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1129 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lynch
v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388-89 (M.D. Ala. 1974).

73. See TEX.REV. Civ.

STAT. ANN.

art. 5547-36(b) (Supp. 1976).

74. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1045 (E.D. Pa.),. stay granted, 96 S.

Ct. 558 (1975).
75. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
76. See Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1976, no writ); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38 (Supp. 1976). The constitutionality of confining a nondangerous person has not yet been fully defined. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). The trend of lower court decisions, however, is toward requiring at least a certain degree of dangerousness. See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 450 (S.D. Iowa 1976).

77. E.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668-69 (D.C.Cir. 1973); Suzuki v.Quisen-

berry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lynch v.. Baxley, 386 F.Supp 378,

393 (M.D.Ala. 1974).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol8/iss3/3

8

Luttrell: Civil Commitment in Texas - An Illusion of Due Process.

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:486

however, on whether the proof must be "beyond a reasonable doubt" or
merely "clear [,unequivocal] and convincing." 7 8s Whichever standard is
chosen, the evidence introduced must meet established rules of admissibility. 79 Thus, admission of hearsay evidence, which prevents confrontation
and cross-examination of the witnesses, should be limited to the recognized
exceptions.8 " Also, opinions or conclusions by expert witnesses alone are not
facts which
sufficient to satisfy the standard of proof. 8 ' The underlying
82
support such opinions must be made a part of the record.
Additionally, the State must prove that there are no alternative treatments
short of total confinement available.8 3 Proof must be made as to available
alternatives, those alternatives that were investigated, and why they were
deemed to be unsuitable.8 4 These alternatives should include consideration
of part-time hospitalization, nursing home placement, out-patient care,
utilization of community mental health services, or placement in the care of a
willing friend or relative.8 5
In Texas the prospective mental patient may elect to have a trial by
jury.86 When this option is exercised, the State has the burden of proving
that the individual is mentally ill and presents a danger to himself or the public.8 7 This proof must be by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence
for temporary commitment and "beyond a reasonable doubt" for indefinite
commitment. 8 The court must also follow established rules on the admissi78. See In re Valdez, 540 P.2d 818, 822 (N.M. 1975).
79. Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Neb. 1975).
80. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 125 (W. Va. 1974).
81. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Miller v. Blalock, 411
F.2d 548, 549 (4th Cir. 1969); Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 950-51 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1976, no writ).
82. See Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 141-43 (5th Cir. 1967); Moss v.
State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 949-51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ). But see Greene
v. State, .537 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ)
(express finding not required).
83. See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 452-53 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Welsch

v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974); cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.

479, 488 (1960) (state powers are constitutionally limited to the minimum infringement
of personal liberty necessary to achieve the state's objective).

84. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132-33 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lynch

v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974).

85. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132-33 (D. Hawaii 1976).

86. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36(e) (Supp. 1976) (jury trial must be
demanded for temporary commitment); id. art. 5547-49(e) (trial by jury may be waived
in proceedings for indefinite commitment).
87. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38 (Supp. 1976).
88. Turner v. State, 543 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ)
(indefinite commitment); Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1976, no writ) (temporary commitment). But see Powers v. State, 543 S.W.2d 194,

196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ) (preponderance of the evidence).
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bility and probative force of the evidence. 9 Although the Code grants the
court power to order the alternative treatment, there is no provision requiring
an investigation of less restrictive alternatives. 90

If a trial by jury is not selected, more fundamental deficiencies arise. 91
When there is no objection, a court may temporarily commit an individual
upon findings based solely on the medical certificates of two physicians. 92 In

many cases, the doctors' certificates lack the facts necessary to support their
conclusions or contain hearsay as a substantial basis for the diagnosis. 93 In
these situations, the judicial hearing is actually a medical determination of
legal rights. 94 Therefore, the court should at least ensure that the certificates
meet the standards of admissibility and contain sufficient facts to support the
burden of proof. Whether or not this would be sufficient to satisfy the due
process requirements is questionable. Introduction of testimony which is not
subject to confrontation and cross-examination by either the court, the proposed patient, or his attorney would not seem to meet the "fundamental
fairness" test.9 5
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

An individual has a right "to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every
step of the [civil commitment] proceedings .
... If the person cannot
afford counsel, an attorney who will provide effective representation must be
appointed.9 7 The ineffectiveness of attorneys ad litem in the unique and
nonadversary environment of civil commitment hearings is well documented.9 8 This has prompted some courts to hold that the attorney must
",9

89. See Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 949-51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no
writ).
90. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38(c) (Supp. 1976).
91. Compare Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1974), with
Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100, 103-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976,
no writ) (dissenting opinion).
92. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-37 (1958).
93. See Morris & Luby, Civil Commitment in a Suburban County: An Investigation by Law Students, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 518, 530 (1973).
94.- See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 424, 448-50 (1966); Note, ConstitutionalProblems of Civil Commitment Proceduresin New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REV. 113, 138 (1975).
95. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967); cf. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 238 (1941) (criminal proceeding).
96. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
97. E.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 448 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki
v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1129 (D. Hawaii 1976); Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d
568, 575-78 (Wash. 1973).
98. See, e.g., Brunetti, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 29 Sw. L.J. 684, 707 (1975);
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally I1, 44
TExAs L. REV. 424, 446-50 (1966); Note, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment
Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1547-48 (1975).
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assume an adversary role and defend his client from commitment to the limits
of professional ethics. °9 Other courts go further and hold that an attorney ad litem is not constitutionally adequate, and that a separate attorney
must be appointed. 100 This position is most persuasive where the attorney
ad litem is appointed to represent a substantial number of individuals at the
same hearing or where a different attorney is appointed for the same person
at subsequent proceedings. 10 1
Texas requires that an attorney ad litem be appointed at the time the
application for commitment is filed.' 0 2 The statute provides little guidance
for the attorney. 10

His effectiveness is measured in the context of each case

by consideration of his advice concerning the client's legal rights and his
efforts in protection of those rights.104 The extent and nature of the attorney's participation has not yet been fully defined, but the trend is definitely
toward the criminal law effectiveness standard. 0 5 The role of the attorney
in Texas civil commitment procedure at times falls far short of this
standard. 06
SELF-INCRIMINATION

The extent of constitutional protection against self-incrimination is uncertain. It is undisputed that the right extends to all criminal acts.' 0 7 'Its application to psychiatric examination or compelled testimony, however, has not

been firmly established. 108

When the proposed patient, even under protest,

99. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (part of hearing); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W. Va. 1974).
100. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1129 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099-1100 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974).
101. Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 575 (Wash. 1973).
102. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-33 (1958) (temporary commitment); id.
art. 5547-43 (indefinite commitment).
103. Id. art. 5547-33 (temporary commitment); id. art. 5547-43 (indefinite commitment).
104. See In re Fisher, 313 N.E.2d 851, 855-56 (Ohio 1974); Moss v. State, 539
S.W.2d 936, 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
105. See Comment, The "Crime" of Mental Illness: Extension of "Criminal" Procedural Safeguards to Involuntary Civil Commitments, 66 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 255,
266 (1975).
106. This assumes that there has not been a drastic change from conditions reported
in Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44
TExAs L. REV. 424, 446-50 (1966). A more recent study in another state suggests
that there have been no meaningful changes. See Note, Constitutional Problems of
Civil Commitment Procedures in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REV. 113, 135-39 (1975).
107. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Moss v. State,
539 S.W.2d 936, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
108. Compare McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 257 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring), and Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1100-02 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), with Karstetter v. Cardwell, 526 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Aronson, Should the Privi-
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cooperates in the physician's examination, it has generally been held that the
need for accurate medical evidence outweighs the individual's interests. 10 9
When the patient refuses to cooperate, however, the coercive power of the
court may be somewhat limited."10 The constitutionality of compelling the individual to testify has apparently not been tested in the courts.
A Texas court recently considered the application of the right to protection
from self-incrimination to psychiatric examination and concluded that the
examinations were constitutional."' The court acknowledged the problems
of the use of coercive force to compel cooperation with the physician and
the use of compelled testimony, but made no effort to resolve them."12
Therefore, the Mental Health Code as construed appears, at the present time,
to be constitutionally adequate in this area."11
APPELLATE REVIEW

Generally, appellate review is not constitutionally required but is considered desirable. 1 4 If appeal is allowed, however, counsel, transcript, and
record must be provided at public expense for those who cannot afford it.'"
The courts must make written findings of fact sufficient to allow a meaningful
review."16
Texas statutes now provide for appeal directly to the courts of civil
appeals."17 It is not necessary to request a new trial, and civil commitment
proceedings receive priority review."18 A transcript of the commitment hearing is provided if appeal is requested."19 Apparently, however, there is no
lege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 55, 93 (1973).
109. See, e.g., Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1155 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972); State
v. Collins, 236 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Iowa 1975) (concurring opinion); Greene v. State,
537 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). Contra,
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1130-32 (D. Hawaii 1976).
110. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1972) (cannot be indefinitely confined for refusing to cooperate with examining psychiatrists).
111. Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
112. Id. at 948.
113. There may, however, be a requirement for the examining physicians to explain
the purpose of the examination. Cf. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1131
(D. Hawaii 1976) (individual may refuse to be examined).
114. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1962) (Stewart, J., concurring); Griffin v. Illinois, 351, U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
115. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1133 (D. Hawaii 1976).
116. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1974); In re Crouch, 221 S.E.2d 74, 75 (N.C. Ct. App.
1976).
117. Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-39d (Supp. 1976) (temporary commitment); id. art. 5547-57 (indefinite commitment).
118. Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 940-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
119. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-39b (Supp. 1976).
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requirement that the lower court make written findings of fact. 120 It is
of an effective appeal
possible this deficiency not only deprives the individual
121
attack.
corpus
but also invites a federal habeas
CONCLUSION

The Texas Mental Health Code appears to be constitutionally deficient in
failing to adequately protect the individual's right to be present at the commitment hearing. 122 It is also at least arguably deficient in failing to
require the examining physicians to appear and testify. The remaining
deficiencies in the civil commitment process involve procedural due process
questions which are within the discretion of the trial court. In evaluating
the effectiveness of counsel, alternative treatment, and whether or not the
State has met the required burden of proof with admissible evidence, the
unique facts and circumstances of each case should be considered. These
facts and circumstances can best be determined and analyzed in an impartial
judicial hearing conducted in accordance with' uniformly applied procedure. 123 The trial courts, however, are confronted with persons alleged to
be seriously mentally ill and whose well being demands a speedy hearing in
a clinical environment. This-together with a crowded docket, minimal
attorney's fees, and a lack of understanding of the complex field of mental
health-exerts considerable pressure on the court and often results in a
summary process.' 24 Because of this pressure there is some doubt that all
trial courts will completely follow the detailed due process procedures set out
by the nondirective opinions of federal district courts. These trial courts
would, understandably, await a binding opinion by a superior court. Nevertheless, since an appeal is now allowed directly to a court of civil appeals,
the legislature has provided for a highly visible, in-depth judicial construction
and constitutional validation of the Mental Health Code. As a result, Texas
appears to have an adequate foundation from which to achieve that delicate
balance between the individual's constitutional rights and the compelling
interest of the state in commitment of the mentally ill.
120. See Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, no writ).
121. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
122. The extent of the constitutional deficiencies cannot be ascertained until the law
becomes more fully developed. In this context, it is significant that the majority of
decisions to date have been rendered by three judge district courts. See cases cited
note 6 supra. As such, the decisions are persuasive but not judicially binding outside
of the injunctive relief granted. See Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S.'
103, 109 (1939). Additionally, federal influence on state civil commitment proceedings may be somewhat curtailed by the holding of Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592 (1975), which extended the doctrine of nonintervention in pending state criminal
proceedings to selected civil suits. See Schmidt v. Lessard, 421 U.S. 957 (1975)
(mem.). But see Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318, 1319-20 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
123. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
124. See Note, Constitutional Problems of Civil Commitment Procedures in New
Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REv. 113, 135-39 (1975).
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